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The topics of argumentative invention have provided our culture with an extremely versatile resource over a very
long time, and so it is not surprising that it would be impossible to give a complete account of their variegated
developments and uses in anything less than a book, probably encompassing several volumes. Realizing this
difficulty, Professor Halsall has taken us on an engaging tour d'horizon of the topics in classical and modern
theories of argumentation, while placing special emphasis on the usefulness of these topics in the analysis of
literature. Following his lead, I will provide a series of footnotes to his sweeping overview, which I hope will
further support the case which he makes for the significance of argumentative patterns for a fuller understanding
of style as well as substance in literature beyond the bounds of argumentative discourse more narrowly
conceived.
 
I
My first note concerns the treatment of the topics in Aristotle's Rhetoric. Professor Halsall discusses the lists of
twenty-eight lines of argumentation in Book II chapter 23 and the ten fallacies in the following chapter 24 (1397a
ff., 1400b ff.). It may be worth noting that in addition to the common topics (koinoi topoi) which do not pertain
to any particular area of expertise, Aristotle also discusses so-called idia (specifics) or stokhei (elements) of
enthymemes (1.2.21-22, 1358a; 1.6.1, 1362a), which in Book II chapters 22 and 26 are equated with topoi
(1396b, 1403a); these idia, or field-specific topics, are propositions useful to the particular species of rhetoric,
and thus especially to the fields of politics and law, and they are considered in chapters 4-15 of Book I (1359a
ff.).1
This discussion of field-specific topics could actually be seen as an anticipation of Stephen Toulmin's idea of
field-dependent standards and warrants of argument.2 It also implicitly points to the possibility of field-specific
propositions useful for the construction of persuasive literary messages; but in literary contexts, the term topos is
often used to refer more to recurrent descriptive commonplaces, such as the locus amoenus,3 a use in which
Curtius equates topics with tropes, and which needs to be carefully distinguished from the inventional-
argumentative conception of topoi which we find in Aristotle's Topics and Rhetoric, as well as in Cicero's
Topics, as discussed by Professor Halsall.4
 
II
Nevertheless, as he points out, we can posit a link between these inventional topics and tropes: stylistic tropes
can often be shown to have argumentative underpinnings and implications. This was noted by Aristotle in the
Rhetoric in his discussion of metaphor in Book III chapters 2 and 10 (1405 a, 1411a ff.), where he points to a
link between metaphor and analogy, an observation also elaborated in his Poetics in chapter 21 (1457b). In
more recent times, the link between tropes and logical topics such as "correspondence," "opposition," and
"connection" was emphasized for instance in DuMarsais' Des Tropes (1730),5 and also in Vico's Institutiones
oratoriae (1711), where metaphor is characterized as the result of rhetorical (and thus argumentative) invention,
and where an explicit link is drawn between poetic concetti and the topics enumerated in Cicero's De
inventione. At the same time, the Ciceronian rhetorical functions of proving or teaching and delighting (docere
and delectare) are seen as jointly carried out in such conceits, which thus combine the rhetorical and poetic
functions of metaphor (Institutiones [ed. Fausto Nicolini] sec. 35). Vico specifically discusses Bouhours (though
not by name), and it would be interesting to investigate whether there may also have been a link with the work of
DuMarsais.6
The argumentative implications of tropes are also explored further in works from our own century which use the
idea of the four "master tropes" (metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, and irony), already identified as such in the
tradition, to analyze discourses which are not primarily aesthetic, but make definite truth claims. I will here no
more than mention Kenneth Burke's essay "Four Master Tropes,"7 and Hayden White's book Metahistory.8
 
III
While I agree with Professor Halsall that tropes in literary works can be fruitfully investigated for their persuasive
topical implications, I would urge great care in such endeavors, and recommend particular attention to the
argumentative ambivalence of tropic patterns. Let me illustrate this caveat with two examples discussed in
Professor Halsall's paper.
In using the seventeen Ciceronian topics from the book of that name, he sees the topic of analogy exemplified in
a passage from Shakespeare's Tempest in which Sebastian says of Gonzalo "Look, he's winding up the watch of
his wit; by and by it will strike" (2.1.12). There is no doubt that there is an analogy here, but I would argue that
the effect of these lines depends not, as is usually the case with analogy, on its appropriateness, on the similarity
between the items compared, but precisely on their dissimilarity, on the inappropriateness of the analogy. I think
we are meant to conclude that Gonzalo is really not witty, because nothing which has to be wound up and will
strike like clockwork deserves to be called by the name of wit; if we accept this reading, the similarity is in fact
invoked ironically, to actually argue for difference here.
The second example I would like to comment upon also comes from Shakespeare, this time from Hamlet,
where Hamlet in his imagination traces the noble dust of Alexander till he finds it stopping a bunghole (5.1.223-
35). This can indeed be seen as a case of the topical pattern of cause and effect, more specifically metalepsis,
defined by Lanham as the attribution of a present effect to a remote cause.9 But again I think some caution is in
order; Hamlet's opening line in this passage, "To what base uses we may return, Horatio," alerts us to the fact
that the point here is not so much to link the stopped bunghole with the remote cause Alexander, but rather to
compare the greater cause of Alexander to its much lesser effect of stopping a bunghole, thus raising in our mind
some doubts about the enduring greatness of Alexander, and a fortiori about the lasting significance of any of us.
 
IV
Professor Halsall rightly argues for a perception of literary works as rhetorical not merely in the narrow sense of
an elocutionary emphasis on tropes and figures, but from a broader perspective as "discourses which make
ethical, logical and emotional appeals in order to persuade readers or spectators of the ideas, norms or attitudes
which they embody," and concludes that therefore "analysis of their argumentative techniques is considered not
merely desirable, but indispensable." His theme limits him to the exploration of the use of the topics in such
analytical endeavors. But I will use the freedom of the commentator to draw in this fourth note your attention to
rhetorical analyses of the persuasive workings of literary works which focus not so much on the stylistic level of
individual figures and tropes and their topical underpinnings, but rather explore larger-scale narrative elements
and structures for their rhetorical implications and persuasive effects.
This tradition can of course be traced back to Aristotle's Poetics, and among authors in this century I would like
to mention again Kenneth Burke, who has pursued such efforts in several of his works, especially in Counter-
Statement (2nd ed. 1952 [1931]) and The Philosophy of Literary Form (3rd ed. 1973 [1941]).10 The most
sustained contemporary effort in this vein is Wayne Booth's Rhetoric of Fiction (2nd ed. 1983 [1961]),11
which provides an eloquent plea against the l'art pour l'art conception of literary fiction, as well as a very
detailed analysis of narrative techniques, enriched by extensive discussions of specific examples from a wide
range of authors.12
More recently, there has been a tendency to reverse the equation of narrative with argument, claiming that
fundamentally all communication in general, and persuasive discourse in particular, can be understood as
narration. A strong exponent of this view has been Walter Fisher, especially in his book Human
Communication as Narration.13 While this approach clearly does produce some interesting insights by
encouraging us to look for elements of storytelling in unusual contexts, I am not sure that the need to maintain
such a sweeping conception of the role of narrative always avoids the danger of extending and thereby thinning
out the concept of narration almost beyond recognition.
 
V
In my fifth and final note I will return from this digression into the rhetorical exploration of literary form and
narrative analysis to our more specific theme of the argumentative topics. I would like to refer briefly to a period
in the development of the topics which is not given much attention in Professor Halsall's survey: the transition
from Late Antiquity to the Middle Ages; and within that period to the work of Boethius, specifically to his book
De differentiis topicis, in which he initially draws on Cicero's Topics for an understanding of the topics as seats
of arguments, or places from which arguments appropriate to the question at hand could be drawn (PL 64, 1174
D).14 But going beyond Cicero, he distinguishes between topical maxims and topical differentiae as topics of
different scope. He characterizes topical maxims as "universal, principal, indemonstrable, and known per se
propositions, which in argumentation give force to arguments," either by themselves appearing directly in the
argumentation, or by providing the implicit foundation for an explicit argument ratifying the conclusion; an
example would be the proposition that "things whose definitions are different are themselves also different," which
would found the argument that an envious man is not wise, because he disparages the good of others, and this is
not consistent with the definition of a wise man (PL 64, 1185 D-1186 A). With such topical maxims he contrasts
the more universal topical differentiae, which refer to the distinguishing characteristics of groups of topical
maxims, usually indicating the kinds of logical relationships upon which the topical maxims in the group focus,
which in the example just given would be definitional (PL 64, 1186 A-B).15
What may give this Boethian innovation some interest for contemporary scholars of argumentation is the
observation by Otto Bird that the topical maxims are somewhat similar to Toulmin's conception of argumentative
warrants, which likewise support the transition from the data to the conclusion of an argument.16 But I think we
should not too broadly invoke the maxim plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose in this particular context,
because the relationship between warrant and backing is not, as Bird claims, exactly parallel to that between
topical maxim and topical difference:17 The topical difference does not back up the topical maxim, but rather
links it to the conclusion.
To illustrate, the topical difference "'Man' is related to 'animal' as species to genus" links the topical maxim "Of
whatever the species is predicated, so is the genus" to the conclusion "Man is an animal";18 but the fact that man
is related as species to genus in no way backs up the contention that of whatever the species is predicated, so is
the genus. By contrast the backing "the class of mammals includes taxonomically all whales" does indeed make
plausible the warrant "all whales are mammals,"19 which in turn authorizes the argumentative transition from the
datum "this is a whale" to the conclusion "this is a mammal." But in spite of such differences beyond points of
contact between ancient and modern argumentation scholarship, the fact remains that not only Chaim Perelman,
who invokes the topics explicitly, as Professor Halsall has shown, but also an author such as Toulmin, who does
not refer to this tradition, may well be seen to carry it forward into our own day.
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